

SWEDISH ARMED FORCES DEFENCE OUTLOOK 2035

# Building A STRONGER DEFENCE

Colonel Per AKERBLOM  
Attaché de défense



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The Defence Outlook 2035 is the start of a journey towards a developed military capability.


This capability will be able to confront military threats and armed attacks on our country regardless of location.

In doing so we can contribute to peace and security in our region.


General Micael Bydén  
Supreme Commander

# Defence outlook purpose

- ≥ For the benefit of governmental and Armed Forces' decision processes
- ≥ Identifying trends and changes in the future operational environment
- ≥ Resulting in required changes to medium term strategic direction



# Political context



# LONG TERM TRENDS

Increased nationalism and protectionism

- Economic challenges
- Increased migration
- Violent extremism
- Rules based world order challenged

Technological advances

- AI, cyber, autonomy and more


Russian great power ambitions

- Advances its positions in the Baltic Sea region
- Does not hesitate to use military force for political ends



# TECHNOLOGY

- Remotely controlled and autonomous systems
- Cyber warfare against civilian and military targets
- Increased dependency on space based systems and increased complexity in space
- Long distance precision strike and hypersonic weapons
- Developments and combinations will provide new capabilities and applications
- Future operating environment will be shaped by technological advances
- **Battlespace temporal compression and spatial expansion**





# OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

- The purpose and scale of a future conflict has changed
- Non-linear (hybrid) warfare against the wider society as a whole
  - A mix of state, commercial and private/individual actors
  - Exploitation of “the Grey zone” between peace and war – benefitting from ambiguity and non-attribution
- Dependency on technology and logistic flows increases vulnerability of society



# SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE

- Access to Swedish territory a strategic advantage, for NATO and Russia
  - Conversely a strategic interest to deny access for the opponent
  - Sweden inescapably involved in the event of a conflict in the Baltic Sea Region
- Russian posturing increases alignment of interests between Sweden and NATO
- NATO presence in the Baltic Sea Region benefits Swedish security





# REGIONAL STABILITY - A SHARED INTEREST

The national increasingly international

- Sweden an integral part of a geopolitical context
  - Commonality of values and geostrategic obligation
  - Solidarity clauses EU 42.7
  - Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity
  - Cooperation: NATO, bi- and multilateral

System of systems approach

- Shared situational awareness and understanding
- Future conflict requires long distance precision strike weapons
  - Suppression of A2/AD
  - For the benefit of national and multinational operations





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# CHALLENGES

- Widened conflict spectrum requires reinforced and additional defence capabilities
  - Future conflict potentially limited in time and geographic scope
- Technology to be successively implemented via acquisition, replacement and refurbishment
  - Allowing for flexibility and adaptation
- Force balance continues shifting to European disadvantage until investments take effect
  - Swedish security policy risk factor increases markedly beyond 2020
  - Need to return risk factor to acceptable level
- **Pressing need for long term policy decisions**



# OPERATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS

Below are the primary operational ramifications shaping the force structure for 2035.

- Increased geographical presence
- Increased capacity to counter hybrid warfare
- Increased force, in capabilities and volumes, capable of engaging in multiple directions
- Improved dispersion measures and generally improved protection
- Capability for long distance effects
- Increased mobility
- Further developed intelligence and security functions
- Improved and sustainable command and control capability
- Generally improved sustainment
- Implementation of technological innovations



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Three key factors to secure military strategic objectives

- Capability and capacity for sustained effort to counter hybrid operations
- Capability and capacity for sustained defensive operations within Swedish territory
- Capability to affect an attacker in all domains and to the full operational depth

These served as guiding principles for the shaping of the Force structure 2035



# FORCE STRUCTURE 2035

Army	4	Brigades (3 mechanised, 1 motorised)
	1	Ranger regiment
	1	Battle group (Gotland)
	12	Air defence battalions
	1	Divisional command, divisional units and support elements
Navy	3	Surface warfare flotillas (one based in the Gothenburg area)
	1	Submarine flotilla
	4	Amphibious battalions
Air Force	8	Fighter squadrons
	1	Helicopter wing
	1	UAV squadron (HALE/MALE)
Operational level	5	Reinforced Regional Commands with increased intelligence and security capacity
	21	Territorial Defence battalions
	40	Home Guard battalions



# PERSONNEL

Twice the number of personnel

2035	2017	
13,200	(6,700)	Junior ranks
46,600	(10,400)	Junior ranks, reserves
11,300	(8,900)	Officers and NCOs
14,000	(2,700)	Officers and NCOs, reserves
26,000	(21,700)	Home guard
7,500	(5,300)	Civilian functionaries
<b>118,600</b>	<b>(55,700)</b>	<b>Total</b>

## Annual military service

2021	8,000
2025	10,000
2035–	≈ 15,000



# EXAMPLES OF NEW EQUIPMENT

## Army

- Improved capability and capacity in air defence
- Modern combat vehicles and tanks
- Improved capability in artillery and long distance precision fires
- Improved baseline equipment

## Navy

- Additional of ships for anti-surface, anti-submarine and mine warfare as well as submarines
- Addition of medium range air defence and long distance precision fires
- Increase and development of unmanned and autonomous vehicles

## Air Force

- Acquisition of 60 additional JAS 39 E
- Replacement of strategic transport aircraft and airborne early warning and control aircraft
- Acquisition of HALE and MALE UAVs



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




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## FM PERSONAL I INTERNATIONELL MILITÄR INSATS (IMI)

FN

NATO

EU

ÖVRIG